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This paper provides benchmarks for monitoring costs and evaluates the net returns to shareholder
activism. I model activism as a sequential decision process consisting of demand negotiations,
board representation, and proxy contest and estimate the costs of each activism stage. A
campaign ending in a proxy fight has average costs of $10.71 million. I find that the estimated
monitoring costs reduce activist returns by more than two-thirds. The mean net activist return is
close to zero but the top quartile of activists earns higher returns on their activist holdings than
on their non-activist investments. The large-sample evidence presented in this paper aids in
understanding the nature and evolution of activist engagements.
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1. Introduction
Does shareholder activism generate positive net returns for the activist? Answering this ques-
tion will help us evaluate the potential for activism to mitigate agency costs due to the separation
of ownership and control. Activist shareholders occupy an important ‘middle ground’ between
internal governance by blockholders and the board of directors and external governance by the
market for corporate control. As a result, the presence of an activist can be crucial for the proper
functioning of a firm’s corporate governance system.
Several recent studies on hedge fund activism have shown that activists generate significant
abnormal returns both in absolute terms and in comparison to non-activist investing.1 Brav, Jiang,
Partnoy, and Thomas (2008) report that the average hedge fund activist in 2001—2006 earned a
14.30% higher return than the size-adjusted value-weighted portfolio of stocks. Klein and Zur (2009)
compare the hostile activist campaigns of hedge funds to those of other entrepreneurial activists,
and find that the market reacts more favorably to hedge fund activism. Clifford (2008) demonstrates
that hedge funds earn significantly higher holding period returns from activist investing than from
their passive holdings. Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2008) show that the activist investments
of the U.K. Hermes Focus Fund significantly outperform the market.
Do these substantial returns cover the costs of executing an activist campaign? In addition
to unobservable costs such as the time and effort of negotiating with a target, an activist bears
disclosure, legal and other fees of hiring proxy advisors, corporate governance experts, investment
banks, public relations, and advertising firms. The existing literature on shareholder activism
lacks a reliable measure for these costs and ignores them in the calculation of activist returns.
Consequently, prior work may have overestimated the returns generated by activism.
A shareholder’s incentives to actively monitor are determined by a trade-off between the pri-
vate costs of monitoring, which are fully internalized by the activist, and the public benefits of
monitoring, which are shared among all firm shareholders (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Shleifer and
Vishny, 1986). The theoretical literature has emphasized the importance of monitoring costs in
1Even though hedge funds have initiated the majority of activist campaigns since 2000, most hedge funds are
non-activist. Kahan and Rock (2007, p. 1046) report estimates by J.P. Morgan that only 5% of hedge fund assets in
2006 were allocated to shareholder activism.
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determining this incentive trade-off.2 However, the empirical literature has faced some challenges
in measuring the cost function of an activist shareholder.
The first challenge has been finding the right institutional setting to analyze an activist’s in-
centive trade-off. Most earlier work focuses on pension funds, mutual funds, and labor unions and
shows that these institutional monitors are severely restricted by regulatory rules and conflicts
of interest.3 More recent studies of hedge fund activism (see Kahan and Rock, 2007; Gillan and
Starks, 2007; Yermack, 2010) have contrasted hedge funds to other institutional activists. Hedge
funds are arguably better positioned to be active monitors because they suffer from fewer conflicts
of interest, face fewer regulatory restrictions, and have a better-aligned incentive structure.
A second challenge in measuring the costs of activism has been the lack of empirical data. Most
evidence about monitoring costs is anecdotal and limited to proxy solicitations– the most public
activist approach. Stephen M. Bainbridge of the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA)
School of Law estimates the costs of a proxy contest at $1.8 million based on a survey conducted
in the late 1980s but points out that “costs almost certainly are much higher today.”Hedge fund
activists estimate proxy costs at "upwards of $10,000,000.”4 However, most activist campaigns rely
on less confrontational approaches such as informal demand negotiations and board representation,
whose costs are unobservable and cannot be estimated from public data.
This paper complements recent work on hedge fund activism by providing cost benchmarks for
evaluating the net returns to activism. To account for the large heterogeneity of activist events, I
estimate the costs associated with three common activist approaches: demand negotiations, board
2See Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner (1994), Kahn and Winton (1998), and Maug (1998) for theoretical models
of the incentive trade-off of a monitor in terms of liquidity, risk aversion, or information acquisition. More recent
theory work on activist monitoring includes Edmans and Manso (2011) and Cohn and Rajan (2011).
3Romano (2001), Kahan and Rock (2007), Davis and Kim (2007), and Cohen and Schmidt (2009) discuss reg-
ulatory constraints and incentive biases preventing mutual funds and pension funds from active monitoring. Del
Guercio (1996) considers the prudent man laws in distorting the incentives of institutional monitors. Agrawal (2012)
studies conflicts of interest in unions. Karpoff (2001), Gillan and Starks (2007), and Yermack (2010) conclude that
institutional activism by pension funds, mutual funds, and unions has had limited impact on firm governance and
performance.
4See Stephen M. Bainbridge (http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/bainbridge121903.htm);
Ralph V. Whitworth (http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-185.pdf); Carl Icahn
(http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/03/30/were-not-the-boss-of-aig/).
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representation, and proxy contest. I find that a campaign ending in a proxy fight has average
costs of $10.71 million. Subtracting costs reduces the mean abnormal activist return by two-thirds
suggesting that costs play a major role in an activist’s decision-making behavior.
The approach taken in this paper involves two interrelated parts. First, I model activism as
a sequential decision process consisting of three consecutive stages of demand negotiations, board
representation, and proxy contest, and define the activist’s break-even constraint for monitoring for
each stage. Then, I examine this trade-off condition in a discrete-choice framework and estimate
the costs of activism implied by the observed decisions of hedge fund activists in 2000—2007.
The starting point of this paper is a novel definition of activism as a sequence of escalating
decision steps, in which an activist chooses a more hostile tactic only after less confrontational
approaches have failed. A typical campaign starts with the announcement of activist intentions
(usually reported in a regulatory filing), followed by communication of specific demands to the
target. Initial negotiations between the activist and the target are rarely successful. The activist
may choose to terminate his campaign after failed negotiations, or pursue a more direct approach
by requesting a board seat. In most instances, the activist is denied board representation, in which
case he has the option to solicit input from other shareholders, and eventually wage a proxy fight.
The activist’s decision problem is modeled as a basic trade-offbetween the expected benefit from
campaign continuation with a specific approach and the expected cost of activist involvement. This
decision can be described by the activist’s break-even profit constraint for monitoring and consists
of two steps. First, the activist estimates a net continuation benefit by comparing his expected
reward from the campaign to the cost of intervening with a particular tactic. Then, he compares
this net benefit to the market value of his current ownership stake. The activist’s continuation
decision defines a minimum cost threshold, at which he is indifferent between continuation and
exit.
I study the activist’s break-even condition as a discrete-choice problem under the assumptions
of random utility theory. The activist’s decision is summarized by the expected gross return in a
successful campaign, which relies on an estimate of its benefit, and the activist’s marked-to-market
investment in the target, which captures the opportunity cost of the campaign. The expected
reward in a successful intervention equals the target’s potential value if the activist’s demands are
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successfully implemented. Empirically, I estimate the potential benefit from an activist engagement
based on the difference in Q ratios between the target and a matched peer, and calibrate it to the
actual valuation improvement in successful activist events.
The estimation procedure consists of a backward sequence of conditional logistic regressions
corresponding to the activist’s break-even constraints for each stage of a campaign. These profit
conditions also provide the structural parameters required for identification of the absolute magni-
tude of monitoring costs and estimation of net returns.
The main contribution of this paper is providing cost benchmarks to assess the net returns to
activism. I separately estimate the costs of three common activist approaches– demand negotia-
tions, board representation, and proxy contest. The proxy contest stage has the highest cost, equal
to $5.94 million for the average campaign during 2000—2007. The demand negotiations stage is
the second most expensive stage of the activist process, with average costs of $2.94 million. The
least expensive tactic is board representation, which adds $1.83 million to the cost of the average
campaign. These estimates represent a first attempt in the literature to quantify the costs of these
common activist tactics.
I calculate net abnormal activist returns in excess of the value-weighted portfolio of stocks (VW
returns) and in excess of characteristic portfolios based on size, market-to-book, and stock return
momentum (DGTW returns).5 The mean annualized VW abnormal return is 4.02% while the mean
DGTW abnormal return is 7.61%. Costs consume more than two-thirds of gross activist returns.
The mean VW abnormal return drops to 0.23% while the mean DGTW abnormal return becomes
2.38% after subtracting costs. The results suggest that the top quartile of activists earns higher
returns on their activist holdings than on their non-activist portfolios.
Another contribution of this paper is the introduction of a large hand-collected data set of
hedge fund activist campaigns between 2000 and 2007. This data set contains detailed information
about the negotiation tactics employed by activists in 1,164 distinct campaigns summarized in 5,645
individual filings by 171 hedge funds and 1,023 unique targets. In addition to data from regulatory
filings, the sample includes activist events reported in the business press as described in Brav et al.
5The calculation of characteristic-based returns follows the approach in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers
(1997).
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(2008).6
The comprehensive data set used in this paper provides new large-sample evidence, which aids
in understanding the nature and evolution of activist engagements. I document that more than
two-thirds of activists quit before making formal demands to their targets. From the sample of
activists who announce specific demands, less than 20% proceed to request a board seat and only
10—12% threaten a proxy contest. Only 7% of activist campaigns end up in a proxy fight.
Activists are most successful when demanding a sale (or privatization) of a target, restructuring
of ineffi cient operations, and additional disclosure, but less successful when asking for higher divi-
dends (or repurchases), Chief Executive Offi cer (CEO) removal, or executive compensation changes.
In terms of the implementation of their demands, 29.17% of activists achieve their objectives. In
terms of holding period returns, only the top quartile of activists earns returns higher than the
returns on their non-activist holdings.
I also show that more confrontational activist tactics have higher success rates. The most
successful activist stage is the proxy contest, in which 57.38% of activists achieve their objectives.
Board representation is effective in 39.33% of the cases while demand negotiations are successful
in only 6.76% of the campaigns. Even though proxy contests are successful in the majority of
activist events, only 7% of campaigns reach the proxy stage suggesting that the high costs of proxy
solicitations deter some activists from pursuing their investment objectives. The evidence in this
paper provides support for the recently failed effort by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to reduce the costs of using the proxy process (often referred to as ‘proxy access’).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a new definition of activism
as a sequential decision process and models the activist’s break-even profit constraint. Section
3 discusses the empirical design, identification, and estimation of target valuations. Section 4
describes the activist sample. Section 5 reports the main empirical results and Section 6 presents
robustness analysis. Section 7 concludes.
6Schedule 13D and proxy statements are the main data sources in this study. Schedule 13D is filed by any investor
who acquires more than 5% of the voting stock of a public company with the intention of influencing its operations
or management. See Appendix A for a detailed description of this filing.
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2. Model framework
2.1. Activism as a sequential process
Gillan and Starks (2007, p. 55) define shareholder activists as “investors who, dissatisfied
with some aspect of a company’s management or operations, try to bring about change within
the company without a change in control.”Tirole (2006, p. 27) provides the following definition:
“Active monitoring consists in interfering with management in order to increase the value of the
investors’claims.”Both definitions comprise “a continuum of possible responses to corporate per-
formance and activities”but do not consider activism as a decision process consisting of a sequential
set of tactics.
Contrast these broad definitions to the way in which activists describe the monitoring process
as a sequence of escalating decision steps.7 Appaloosa Management writes to Beverly Enterprises:
“Although we continue to prefer pursuing a negotiated transaction with the Company, your actions
have left us no choice but to nominate a slate of directors for election at your upcoming annual
meeting. [...] Our nominees, if elected, will, subject to their fiduciary duties, be committed to
going forward with a process that would give due consideration to our offer as well as any other
proposals the Company may receive.”8
Another example comes from a letter by Seymour Holtzman of Jewelcor Management to the
Chairman of Thistle Group, “My reason for proposing a slate of Directors is for the purpose of
hiring an investment banker to seek out an attractive merger partner who would be willing to
pay a significant premium for our stock. [...] Moreover, if you were to assure the shareholders of
your willingness to do this, I would give serious consideration to withdrawing my proposed slate of
Directors. I know that you and your family are larger shareholders and I hope you will act in the
best interest of all of the shareholders, so the Company will not have to waste time and money in
a proxy contest.”9
The above anecdotal statements underscore two common patterns in the data. First, activists
consider a range of tactics in their discussions with a target– demand negotiations, board represen-
7See also Appendix B describing Carl Icahn’s campaign at Time Warner Inc.
8Full letter available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1006438/000089534505000135/exhi99_10.txt.
9Full letter available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1056590/000105659002000009/exhibitc.txt.
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tation, and proxy threat/fight. Second, these tactics form an escalating sequence from less hostile
to more confrontational. An activist chooses a more hostile tactic only after less confrontational
approaches have failed to produce results.
A typical campaign starts with the announcement of activist intentions, usually reported in
Schedule 13D. This regulatory form (also known as a “beneficial ownership report”) must be filed
with the SEC by anyone who acquires more than 5% of the voting stock of a public company
with the intention of influencing its operations or management.10 The majority of initial 13D
filers terminate their campaigns without announcing demands. These hedge funds may have filed
Schedule 13D for legal reasons or in anticipation of an activist engagement but decided against
it. This sample of activists is instrumental in estimating the costs of the first stage of the activist
process (demand negotiations).
Insert Figure 1
Shortly after the initial filing of Schedule 13D, the activist formally communicates a set of
specific demands (such as a sale of the company, restructuring of ineffi cient operations, additional
share repurchases, etc.) to the management of the target. The formal announcement of activist
demands marks the beginning of the first stage of the activist process– demand negotiations. This
first stage is rarely successful despite its high costs in terms of the activist’s time and effort. Upon
failure of initial demand negotiations, the activist may choose to terminate the campaign, or request
board representation, which allows for a more direct interaction with the target’s management. This
second stage of the activist process starts with an offi cial request for board representation, most
often accomplished by a nomination notice, a shareholder proposal, or a publicly filed letter. Board
representation has a higher success rate than demand negotiations but increases the overall costs
of a campaign. As a result, only one-fifth of initial 13D filers request a board seat.
If the activist does not obtain board representation, he may start soliciting input from other
shareholders by filing a preliminary proxy statement (stage 3), and eventually wage a proxy fight
(stage 4). The proxy contest stage has the highest success rate in terms of implementing the
10 In addition to data from regulatory filings, the sample includes nonpublic activist campaigns (i.e., events below
the filing threshold of 5%) reported in the press, as described in Brav et al. (2008).
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activist’s demands but is also the most costly. As a result, less than one-tenth of the original 13D
filers initiate proxy contests.
Defined in this way, the activist process evolves from private to more public forms of engagement.
There is some anecdotal evidence describing the legal and disclosure costs of the proxy contest
stage. However, most of the costs of the demand negotiations and board representation stages are
unobservable and cannot be estimated from publicly available information.
2.2. The activist’s decision problem
Ralph V. Whitworth of Relational Investors describes their decision whether to initiate
a proxy contest as follows: “Although the credible ability to initiate a proxy contest under the
existing rules has been effective for Relational in many cases, in others, costs and procedural burdens
resulted in our electing not to use the process even though we were convinced that improved board
composition would create value for all shareholders. In the latter set of cases, the projects are often
abandoned or not taken in the first instance.”11
The above statement describes the decision problem of an activist as a basic trade-off between
the expected benefit from an activist intervention (with a specific tactic) and the expected cost of the
engagement. The activist’s choice set, denoted below by n ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, corresponds to commonly
observed activist tactics, as described in the sequential definition of activism. Specifically, 0 =
activist intentions but no specific demands, 1 = demand negotiations, 2 = board representation, 3
= (threatened) proxy contest. The activist selects more confrontational tactics only if less hostile
approaches fail to convince the target to implement the proposed demands. Intuitively, more
aggressive tactics have a higher probability of success but increase the overall cost of a campaign.
The activist’s break-even profit constraint for monitoring compares the expected benefit from
campaign continuation against its costs. The expected benefit in a successful campaign is based
on an estimate of the target’s maximum potential value, which equals its valuation if the activist’s
demands are successfully executed. This continuation value corresponds to the difference between
the target’s fundamental value, Vi, and its current market value, Mi, and is a suffi cient statistic for
11Letter from Ralph V. Whitworth, Principal of Relational Investors LLC, to the SEC, August 14, 2009
(http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-185.pdf).
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the profitability of the campaign. In the empirical analysis, the continuation benefit is measured
by the difference in Q ratios between the target and a matched peer and is robust to a variety of
definitions and estimation procedures.
The costs of an activist campaign include disclosure, legal and other fees of hiring proxy advisors
and solicitors, corporate governance experts, investment banks, public relations and advertising
firms, in addition to unobservable costs such as the time and effort of the activist. This study
assumes that costs vary with the choice of tactic but are independent of campaign characteristics,
i.e., the costs of each stage are fixed across activists. The empirical analysis relaxes this assumption
by including activist fixed effects such as experience, preference for confrontation, and ‘busyness’
in the estimation of costs.
The activist’s decision involves two consecutive steps. First, he estimates a net continuation
benefit by comparing his expected return from campaign continuation to the cost of intervening with
a particular tactic. Then, he compares this net benefit to the current market value of his ownership
stake, which reflects the market’s perception of the target’s value improvement so far.12 A binding
break-even profit constraint defines a minimum cost threshold associated with the stage, at which
the activist terminates the campaign. Using the exit decisions of activists in the sample period, I
am able to derive a sequence of cost thresholds implied by the investors’observed decision-making
behavior.
Consider the activist’s decision at stage n. Upon failure of this stage, he has to decide whether
to sell at the current market valuation, Min, or continue with a more confrontational tactic (n+1),
which has a higher probability of success but will increase the cost of the campaign. At stage
(n+1), the activist eliminates the target’s discount from fundamental value with some probability,
pi,n+1, or fails with a complementary probability. In the latter case, he is faced with a similar choice
between continuation and exit.13
12Note also that an unsuccessful exit by an activist is typically penalized by the market. Brav et al. (2008) show
that the market reacts very negatively to hedge fund exits in failed campaigns resulting in negative abnormal returns
of -4% in the (-20, +20) window around exit.
13The model assumes that each stage of the activist process has a fixed duration, which allows me to replace
the time subscript t with the stage subscript n in the rest of this section. See the empirical analysis for evidence
supporting this assumption.
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The activist’s problem can be summarized by the expected utility of each alternative. The
activist compares his utility from continuation, U contin , to the utility from selling at the current
market valuation, U exitin :
U contin = −cn+1 + pi,n+1E (πi,n+1Vi,n+1) + (1− pi,n+1)E
[
max
{
πi,n+1Mi,n+1, U
cont
i,n+1
}]
(1)
U exitin = πinMin.
Here, πin denotes the current activist ownership, and cn+1 is the cost of stage n + 1.14 U conti,n+1
is the utility from continuation to the subsequent stage, if applicable. The activist’s break-even
constraint can be written as:
U contin = U
exit
in <=> Ũin = U
cont
in − U exitin = 0. (2)
For example, consider the activist’s choice at the last decision stage– the decision node before
the proxy contest stage. The activist compares his utility from the two available alternatives–
continue to a proxy fight, U conti2 , or sell at the current market price, U
exit
i2 , as follows:
U conti2 = −c3 + pi3πiVi3 + (1− pi3)πiMi3 (3)
U exiti2 = πiMi2.
The activist continues to the proxy stage if
Ũi2 = −c3 + pi3πiVi + (1− pi3)πiMi − πiMi ≥ 0 (4)
Ũi2 =
(
− c3
pi3
)(
1
πiMi
)
+
(
Vi
Mi
)
− 1 ≥ 0.
The above transformation summarizes the activist’s decision by two explanatory variables: the
expected gross return from a successful campaign,
(
Vi
Mi
)
(continuation decision), and the current
value of the investment in the target,
(
1
πiMi
)
(exit decision). The break-even condition assumes
that the activist’s best estimate of his continuation reward equals the target’s current gap from
potential firm value, i.e., the activist does not time the market. This assumption is reasonable if
we believe that any attempt by the activist to manipulate the market’s perception of his success
will result in an immediate negative correction of the target’s price to its current value.
14The empirical evidence in Section 5 supports the modeling assumption that the activist would not use ownership
strategically to exert more pressure on the target. Hence, I drop the stage subscript for π.
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More generally, the activist’s stage-specific break-even constraint is
Ũin = χn+1
(
1
πiMi
)
+
(
Vi
Mi
)
− 1 = 0, (5)
where
χ3 = −
c3
pi3
(6)
χ2 = max
{
−c2 − (1− pi2)c3
pi2 + pi3 − pi2pi3
,
−c2
pi2
}
χ1 = max
{
−c1 − (1− pi1)c2 − (1− pi1)(1− pi2)c3
pi1 + pi2 + pi3 − pi1pi2 − pi1pi3 − pi2pi3 + pi1pi2pi3
,
−c1 − (1− pi1)c2
pi1 + pi2 − pi1pi2
,
−c1
pi1
}
.
The next section rewrites the activist’s stage-specific break-even condition into a discrete-choice
model by adding an error structure, which reflects our imperfect knowledge of the utility from
each decision alternative. This allows estimation of activist costs without imposing additional
assumptions about the parameter distributions.
3. Econometric design
3.1. Random utility specification
The activist’s break-even constraint for monitoring can be studied in a regression framework
under the general assumptions of random utility theory. This step transforms the activist’s decision
into a discrete-choice problem, in which his choice between continuation and exit at each stage is
summarized by the utility of each alternative.15
The activist knows the utility of campaign continuation (denoted by U∗in) as well as the utility
of exit (U∗in′). The econometrician estimates the activist’s representative utility, Uin and Uin′ ,
respectively, based on some observable characteristics of each alternative such as the expected
gross return of a successful campaign and the present value of the investment in the target. These
estimates differ from the activist’s true utility by an error term, which captures unobservable factors
that vary among activists with the same representative utility such as preference for (or experience
15See Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) and Train (2003) for surveys of the literature on discrete-choice models.
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with) a specific tactic.
U∗in = Uin + εin (7)
U∗in′ = Uin′ + εin′ .
Assuming an exogenous sample of activists whose decisions are independent, we write the prob-
ability of activist i choosing alternative n as the following expression:
Pr {U∗in > U∗in′} = Pr {Uin + εin > Uin′ + εin′} = Pr {εin′ − εin < Uin − Uin′} (8)
=
∫
ε
I {εin′ < εin + Uin − Uin′} f(ε)dε,
where I is an indicator function equal to one when the expression in the parentheses is correct.
Assuming independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Type I extreme value errors results
in the logit formulation, which simplifies Eq. (8) further.
Pr {U∗in > U∗in′ |εin}i 6=j =
∏
i 6=j
exp(− exp(− (εin + Uin − Uin′))) (9)
Pr {U∗in > U∗in′}i 6=j =
∫ ∏
i 6=j
exp(− exp(− (εin + Uin − Uin′)))
 exp(−εin) exp(− exp(−εin))dεin.
Using the fact that the difference between two extreme values is distributed logistically, the
above expression takes the following closed form for a binary choice:
Pr {U∗in > U∗in′} =
exp(Uin)
1 + exp(Uin)
. (10)
We derive the standard logistic regression model by assuming a linear probability specification:
Pr {U∗in > U∗in′} =
exp(x′β)
1 + exp(x′β)
(11)
Pr
{
U∗in > U
∗
in′
}
Pr
{
U∗in ≤ U∗in′
} = exp(x′β)
log
(
Pr
{
U∗in > U
∗
in′
}
Pr
{
U∗in ≤ U∗in′
}) = x′β.
As a result, the activist’s stage-specific break-even constraint can be rewritten into a regression
equation, which takes an analogous form for each stage:
log
(
continue
exit
)
= β̂1n
(
1
πinMin
)
+ β̂2n
(
Vin
Min
)
. (12)
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Activist costs are estimated using the above regression equation for each stage of activism. The
first coeffi cient in each regression estimates relative stage costs. The second coeffi cient identifies a
stage-specific parameter, which is required to find the absolute magnitude of each cost threshold
(as described next).
3.2. Identification
Monitoring costs are estimated using the activist’s break-even profit condition (as defined
in Eq. (12)). The empirical procedure consists of two simultaneous parts– a system of conditional
logistic regressions, which separately derives the costs of each stage, and statistical backward in-
duction, which uses the estimated costs of later stages in the calculation of the costs of the earlier
stages of activism.16 That is, the activist’s decision problem is estimated equation by equation
following a recursive system of substitutions.
Each logistic regression corresponds to a stage-specific break-even profit constraint and uses
the conditional sample of activists who have reached the current decision step and are choosing
whether to continue to the next stage.17 The starting point of the estimation is the last decision
stage, where the activist chooses whether to initiate a proxy contest.18 The activist’s break-even
profit constraint (Eq. (4)) defines a minimum cost threshold associated with the continuation to
a proxy. Then, the estimated costs of the proxy stage are used as inputs in the calculation of the
costs of board representation and demand negotiations.
A significant advantage of the chosen empirical design versus other structural methods is that
costs can be estimated without imposing any additional assumptions on the parameter distributions.
The first coeffi cient estimate, β̂1n, in each logistic regression determines (up to scale) stage-specific
costs. β̂1n can be given the following general interpretation:
β̂1n = χ̂n =
stage cost function
stage continuation probability
. (13)
16See Bas, Signorino, and Walker (2008) for a discussion of statistical backward induction.
17This technique is qualitatively similar to using a sequential response model, a limiting case of the nested logit
model, in which the probability of making a transition from stage n of the activist process to stage n+1 is conditional
on having reached n.
18The estimation sample includes only failed activist campaigns, i.e., campaigns in which the activist faces the
decision whether to continue or exit at a specific stage in the process.
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The first regression coeffi cient determines relative stage costs but does not identify the absolute
magnitudes of these costs. This is due to the underidentification of the logistic regression model,
i.e., its estimation imposes an arbitrary restriction on the variance of the random error term.19
This is equivalent to normalizing the scale of utility, or scaling each regression coeffi cient by 1/σε∗in
(see Train, 2003), i.e.,
β̂in =
1
σε∗in
<=> σε∗in =
1
β̂in
. (14)
Most empirical studies using logistic estimation are interested in the relative magnitudes of
the regression coeffi cients and are not affected by this underidentification problem. However, we
cannot determine the absolute magnitudes of monitoring costs without an exogenous identification
restriction that fixes σε∗in . Based on the activist’s break-even profit condition (defined in Eqs. (5)
and (6)), I constrain the coeffi cient on the second explanatory variable to one and free an additional
degree of freedom to estimate absolute stage costs. This restriction fixes the scale of utility at each
stage and pins down the absolute magnitude of stage costs.
The stage-specific scale parameters control for unobserved heterogeneity in the activist sample
and lead to more precise cost estimates. Intuitively, we expect the scale parameters to become
smaller with every consecutive stage because the activists employing more confrontational tactics
are more homogeneous. The results in Table 7 confirm that the proxy contest has the lowest scale
parameter while the negotiations stage has the highest scale parameter.
3.3. Target valuation and campaign return
The activist’s choice between campaign continuation and exit is described by two explana-
tory variables– the expected gross return from a successful intervention,
(
Vi
Mi
)
, and the current
value of the activist’s investment in the target firm,
(
1
πiMi
)
. A crucial step of the empirical design
is finding Vi, a target’s fundamental (or ‘frontier’) valuation. The modeling setup in this paper
assumes that a target will achieve its maximum potential value if the campaign’s demands are
successfully implemented.
19Typically, it is assumed that the random utility component is distributed Type I extreme value with variance
π2/6.
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The fundamental value of a firm is unobservable and has to be estimated. The right measure
needs to reflect the potential for value improvement as a result of an activist intervention. Generally,
a firm’s valuation may diverge from its potential value due to both operational ineffi ciencies (such
as an outdated plant) and agency issues (for example, poor management). Both of these problems
can be alleviated by effective active monitoring.
Valuation metrics based on a target’s current market value are inappropriate because they may
be confounded by market expectations and/or fail to fully reflect the potential value improvement
from activism. Using market price reactions as a measure of activist reward will generally under-
estimate the expected benefits from successful activism [see Brav et al. (2008) for a discussion].
Consequently, I estimate a target’s maximum value as the valuation of a matched peer with similar
fundamentals. To produce a valid measure of a target’s valuation improvement due to activism,
the chosen valuation metric needs to satisfy three important conditions.
First, any suitable estimate of ‘frontier’value needs to measure a target’s fundamental valuation
along dimensions, which are independent of the activist’s intervention. This prescribes the use of
firm-level characteristics that are likely to remain unaffected by the activist’s demands. Following
Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012), I match targets to other Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP)/Compustat firms based on size (defined as the log of sales), asset turnover (sales
over total assets), market share (sales divided by total industry sales), growth (average sales growth
during the past two years), and R&D ratio (research and development expense divided by sales).
Second, the estimation of potential value needs to allow for ‘noise’due to luck, misvaluation,
or idiosyncratic factors. In the presence of noise, a target and its matched peer(s) are unlikely to
achieve identical market valuations even if an activist successfully corrects the former’s operational
and agency problems. Consequently, the calculation of fundamental value assumes that an activist
can improve a target’s valuation to that of the best performing peer in the same value tercile as
the target. This conservative approach limits a target’s potential value improvement and biases
the estimated costs of activism downward.
Third, the definition of fundamental value needs to properly reflect the potential for value
improvement in a successful campaign. I calibrate a parameter in the quantile regression to the
median value improvement achieved by successful activists, which is calculated as 35.38% based
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on the sample of successful campaigns in 2000—2007. As a result, the estimation of a target’s
fundamental value is consistent by construction with the returns of successful activists.
The estimation of fundamental values starts by dividing all CRSP/Compustat firms in a given
year into terciles based on sales, asset turnover, market share, growth, and R&D ratio. Then, I
calculate a target’s maximum potential value by using a censored quantile regression of the target’s
Q ratio on the tercile ranks of each of the five characteristics. The censored least absolute deviations
estimator of Powell (1984) is an extension of the original approach of Koenker and Bassett (1978)
and is robust to heteroskedasticity.
A firm’s Q ratio is defined as market equity plus total debt plus preferred stock plus deferred
taxes and investment credit divided by total assets (as in Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender, 2008).
The estimation of maximum value is robust to alternative Q definitions, such as the one in Hen-
nessy, Levy, and Whited (2007) who define Q as total assets plus market equity less book equity
less balance sheet deferred taxes divided by total assets. The Q ratio is a suitable measure for
the activist’s reward from a successful campaign because it reflects both the probability of being
targeted and the potential for improvement in undervalued companies.20
In an alternative specification, I use a target’s industry affi liation as the only determinant of its
‘frontier’value. This approach borrows from the takeover literature, which frequently uses industry
analysis to evaluate potential takeover targets (known as the “comparable company”method). I
assume that an activist can improve a target’s value to that of the best performing industry peer in
the same value tercile as the target. In particular, I divide all CRSP/Compustat firms in the sample
period into terciles based on their Q ratios. Then, I assume that a target’s maximum potential
value equals the value of the best performing three-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
industry peer within the same value tercile. Both explanatory variables retain their statistical and
economic significance under this alternative specification (as reported in Table 9).
20Brav et al. (2008, p. 1754) demonstrate that “a one standard deviation decrease in Q is associated with a 0.49
percentage point increase in the probability of being targeted, other things being equal.”
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4. Campaign data
4.1. Sample construction
I use data from SEC Schedule 13D, preliminary and definitive proxy statements, and
SharkRepellent.net to construct a comprehensive data set of hedge fund activist campaigns be-
tween 2000 and 2007. My focus is on the negotiation tactics used during each campaign. I also
collect information about each activist’s investment intent and demands, the specifics of his com-
munication with the target, the firm’s response, and the outcome of each demand.
Schedule 13D must be filed by any person or group that acquires more than 5% of the voting
stock of a public company with the intention of influencing its operations or management. More
importantly, the SEC requires an amended filing within ten days of any material change in the
amount or intent of ownership, which allows me to track the evolution of each campaign through
its stages. Appendix A provides a detailed description of SEC Schedule 13D.
A major challenge in the data collection is consistently identifying activist hedge funds. I follow
a multi-step procedure. First, I start with a list of important 13D filings reported by Dow Jones
Newswires in the period between 2000 and 2007. The list contains approximately 5,000 filings
but about 15% of them are not by hedge funds. The next step is to verify the identity of the
filers. I use at least two of the following sources: FT.com’s 100 Hedge Funds to Watch (April
27, 2007), Institutional Investor’s Alpha Magazine Hedge Fund 100 (2002—2008), Infovest21’s 714
Hedge Fund Managers Register (February 1, 2006), and a list of hedge fund activists provided by
Robin Greenwood (see Greenwood and Schor, 2009). I supplement the sample by searching Factiva
for the following text strings: “filer name and hedge fund,”“filer name and 13D,”“filer name and
activism.” I also use Internet searches for Web sites and articles about the 13D filers. This step
yields approximately 200 hedge funds and managers, which I group into 129 hedge fund families.
Then, I download from SEC.gov all 13D filings and their amendments for the final list of hedge
funds. I collect the following data points: the filing and event dates; the identity and Central Index
Key (CIK) of the fund; whether the activist files a 13F report with the SEC; the target’s name,
CIK, CUSIP, and SIC code; the percentage owned by the activist; the list of demands; the target’s
reaction, and the outcome of each demand.
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Item 4 of Schedule 13D provides details about the purpose of each transaction. This section
requires disclosure of any specific plans or proposals with respect to the company such as an
acquisition, a reorganization, a change in capital structure, dividend policy, board of directors,
bylaws, etc. I group demands in five categories– corporate governance, strategic alternatives,
corporate structure, opposition to a proposed transaction, and general undervaluation. Activists
who choose the last category without making subsequent demands could be considered passive
investors.
I supplement the sample with data from two additional sources. It is common for an activist
to threaten a proxy fight without actually filing proxy materials with the SEC. For example, an
activist may file a so-called preliminary proxy statement soliciting materials from shareholders as a
‘scare tactic’to induce cooperation by a target. To differentiate between a proxy threat and a proxy
fight, I collect all preliminary (PREC 14A and PREN 14A) and definitive (DFAN 14A and DEFN
14A) proxy filings from SEC.gov. I also use additional outcome data from SharkRepellent.net for
the campaigns whose final outcome is not reported in their Schedule 13D.
To account for activist engagements with no Schedule 13D filings (i.e., events below the 5%
filing threshold), I incorporate the nonpublic activist campaigns used in Brav et al. (2008). Data
on these campaigns were collected “through news searches . . . plus a general search using various
combinations of ‘hedge fund’ and ‘activism’ as key words” (p. 1738). Of the 25 events, one
was already included in the original sample, two had insuffi cient press coverage, and one involved
preferred shares and non-activist intentions.
For the remaining 21 campaigns, I perform Factiva searches in order to collect information
necessary to fit these events in the sequential definition of activism– tactics and their announcement
dates, demands, and outcomes. Of the 21 events, nine exit after demand negotiations (three
successes), four exit after board representation (all successful), and eight after proxy contest (three
successes).21 The inclusion of these nonpublic activist events does not affect the cost estimates
reported in this paper.
After excluding Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs; SIC 6798), bankrupt companies, blank
21Note that these events represent a nonrandom sample of campaigns below the 5% filing threshold because they
involve large and newsworthy targets with above-average press coverage.
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check entities (SIC 6770), trusts (6792), American Depository Receipts (ADRs), and events whose
start is before 2000, my final sample consists of 1,164 distinct campaigns described in 5,645 indi-
vidual filings involving 171 hedge funds and 1,023 unique targets.
4.2. Summary of activist events
Defining activism as a sequential process allows for a more detailed description of its evo-
lution than previous academic studies. Hedge fund activists achieve different levels of success with
the various tactics they employ and do not seem to use ownership strategically to affect campaign
outcomes. Common demands consist of major operational or capital structure changes and fre-
quently involve consideration of strategic alternatives. Activists are becoming more confrontational
and are not afraid to go to a proxy fight or even bid for a target if its management refuses to listen
to their demands. These observations add to the empirical evidence on what makes hedge funds
more successful monitors than other types of institutional activists.
Table 1, Panel A, presents the distribution of hedge fund activist campaigns by year.22 The
number of activist events increased more than three times from 135 in 2001 to 565 in 2007, sig-
nificantly outpacing the growth of hedge fund assets under management during the same period.
More importantly, there was a substantial shift in the activists’preferred tactics from informal ne-
gotiations to more confrontational (and public) approaches. Hedge fund activists requested board
representation in 16.81% of the campaigns in 2007 versus only 11.85% in 2001 (a 42% increase). The
use of the proxy process showed a 50% increase, 12.21% in 2007 versus 8.15% in 2001. Both trends
suggest that activist hedge funds are increasingly following a more hostile (and public) approach.
Insert Table 1
Panel B of Table 1 describes the progression of a typical campaign across the stages of the
activist process as defined in this paper. The first two columns summarize the data for the full
activist sample, which includes 5,645 individual filings involving 171 hedge funds and 1,164 unique
22The analysis in Panel A of Table 1 excludes the first year of the sample period to correct for left censoring (i.e.,
campaigns initiated before the beginning of the sample period).
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targets. The last two columns of the table present the CRSP-Compustat merged sample, which
includes 4,610 individual filings and 953 unique targets.23
As seen in Table 1, more than two-thirds of activists quit before making formal demands to
their targets. These hedge funds may have filed Schedule 13D for legal reasons or in anticipation
of an activist engagement but decided against it.24 From the sample of activists who formally
communicate specific demands to their targets, less than 20% proceed to request a board seat and
only 10—12% threaten a proxy contest. Surprisingly, only 7% of the activist campaigns end up in
a proxy fight.
The most active hedge funds during 2000 to 2007 are Loeb Partners Corp./Third Point Man-
agement, Millennium Management, Steel Partners II L.P., Farallon Capital, and ValueAct Capital
Management. The top 25 hedge funds listed in Table 2 account for more than half of all campaigns
in the sample period. The most confrontational hedge fund activists are Carl Icahn, Steel Partners
II L.P., Financial Edge Fund L.P., Bulldog Investors G.P., Barington Capital Group L.P./Clinton
Group, and Ramius L.L.C. The evidence suggests that both experience and preference for a specific
tactic may be important in explaining the investment behavior of an activist. In the main empirical
analysis, I show that both fixed effects are statistically significant.
Insert Table 2
4.2.1. Activist demands and success rates
Table 3, Panel A, presents the most common campaign demands during the sample pe-
riod.25 I classify the activists’stated objectives into four broad categories: strategic direction and
alternatives (56% of the sample), capital structure (20%), opposition to a proposed transaction
(13%), and corporate governance (12%).
23Target CIK codes obtained from Schedule 13D filings are manually matched to CRSP PERMNOs.
24The initial 13D filers who do not announce specific demands can be considered passive investors and are excluded
from most of the analysis in this paper. However, I use the sample of initial filers in estimating the costs of the first
stage of demand negotiations.
25The total number of demands listed in the table exceeds the number of campaigns with formal demands because
activists make multiple demands in some campaigns.
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As previously shown in the literature, the most frequent demand is for a sale of the target
to a third party (one-third of all events), followed by demands for higher dividends (or share
repurchases), and restructuring of ineffi cient operations. Greenwood and Schor (2009, p. 363)
argue that “activism targets earn high returns primarily when they are eventually taken over.”In
the robustness section, I evaluate the impact of takeover activity on campaign outcomes and find
that the average return difference between the M&A and non-M&A samples is not statistically
significant after controlling for the activists’stated objectives.
Insert Table 3
Hedge fund activists not only demand a sale of their targets to third parties but also bid for the
targets themselves in more than 10% of the campaigns. As Kahan and Rock (2007, p. 1040) point
out: “these bids can be part of a strategy to improve the governance or capital structure of these
companies or to put the target in play.”In a New York Times article, Carl Icahn argues that it is
simplistic to suggest that activists “simply bang on the boardroom table and demand a sale”and
indicates that takeover activity is part of his broad activist agenda.26
The campaign of Jana Partners at Houston Exploration illustrates what role Jana’s bid played
in their overall campaign. Shortly after accumulating a 10% stake in February 2006, Jana’s Barry
Rosenstein sent a letter to the Company’s board expressing his belief that Houston Exploration
should use the proceeds from some recent asset sales to repurchase shares as well as explore strate-
gic alternatives, including a sale.27 A week later, Jana issued a letter to shareholders urging them
to withhold vote from the Company’s directors.28 On June 12, Jana offered to purchase Houston
Exploration for $62 per share, after accusing the Board of "a possible breach of their fiduciary du-
ties and waste of corporate assets."29 Jana’s bid attracted interest from Forest Oil, which acquired
Houston Exploration in January 2007. As this example demonstrates, Jana’s motivation– to pres-
sure the board and attract bids from third parties– is distinctly different from the motivation for
a toehold acquisition (to help a future takeover by the toehold buyer).
26“Another view: Icahn defends his record”by Carl Icahn, published in the New York Times on August 17, 2011
(http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/17/another-view-carl-icahn-defends-his-record/).
27See letter at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1015293/000090266406001253/exhibita.txt.
28See press release at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1015293/000090266406001276/exhibit99.txt.
29See acquisition letter at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1015293/000090266406001648/exhibit99.txt.
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Table 3 also reports the average success rate of each demand. As in previous studies of hedge
fund activism (see Brav et al., 2008; and Klein and Zur, 2009), an activist campaign is classified as
successful if the activist achieves his main investment objective(s) or reaches a partial agreement
with the target. Activists are most successful when demanding a sale (or privatization) of a target,
restructuring of ineffi cient operations, and additional disclosure but less successful when asking for
higher dividends (or repurchases), CEO removal, or executive compensation changes. In terms of
their demands, 29.17% of activists achieve their objectives.30 Using holding period activist returns
as an alternative measure of success, I find that only the top quartile of activists earns higher returns
on their activist holdings than on their non-activist portfolios (see the return analysis presented in
Table 8).
Panel B of Table 3 reports the success rate of activism by stage. I find that more confrontational
activist tactics have higher success rates. The most successful activist stage is the proxy contest, in
which 57.38% of activists achieve their objectives. Board representation is effective in 39.33% of the
cases while demand negotiations are successful in only 6.76% of the campaigns. These results need
to be interpreted with caution as the decision to continue an activist engagement is endogenous to
each campaign.
4.2.2. The activist’s investment horizon and capital commitment
Are hedge fund activists short-term investors who make a quick profit at the expense of
long-term shareholders? The data do not support this criticism. Panel A of Table 4 reveals that
the average duration of an activist campaign is 15 months. Excluding events in which no formal
demands are announced raises the average campaign horizon to 19 months.
Insert Table 4
Panel B of Table 4 reports that the mean (median) duration of an activist stage is seven (three)
months. There is virtually no variability in the mean (median) duration across the different stages
30Note that classifying board representation as an activist tactic rather than a campaign demand lowers the
estimated success rate of activism compared to previous studies. Including board representation demands raises the
success rate in my sample to 46%, which is in line with the estimates in Brav et al. (2008) and Greenwood and Schor
(2009).
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of activism. This empirical observation serves as the basis for the convenient modeling assumption
that each stage of the activist process has a fixed duration.
What is the activist’s capital commitment during a campaign? Panel A of Table 5 reports
that the mean (median) initial ownership stake at the start of a campaign is 8.27% (8.00%) of
the target’s outstanding shares. In terms of the average target valuation of $868.54 million, the
mean (median) initial dollar stake is $71.83 million ($69.48 million). The mean (median) maximum
ownership stake over the duration of the campaign is 9.11% (9.00%). The ownership data show
that activists do not significantly increase ownership during a campaign.
Insert Table 5
Another interesting question is whether activists vary their ownership with the tactics they
employ. Panel A of Table 5 reports that the median change in ownership (calculated as the difference
between the maximum and initial ownership during an activism stage) is zero while the mean change
in ownership is 30.61% corresponding to an increase of only 2.79%. The small magnitude of these
changes suggests that activists do not use high ownership to exert pressure in their negotiations
with a target.
Panel B of Table 5 further evaluates the role of activist ownership on campaign outcomes by
comparing successful versus failed and friendly versus hostile campaigns. As before, a campaign is
classified as successful if the activist achieves his objectives or reaches a partial agreement with the
target. As seen in Panel B, there is no statistical difference between successful and failed campaigns
in terms of initial ownership, maximum ownership, or change in ownership.
Panel B also compares friendly and hostile campaigns, where a campaign is considered friendly
if the interaction between an activist and a target is positive on average. This hand-collected
communication consists of letters, phone conversation transcripts, presentations, etc. disclosed as
part of Schedule 13D and coded as either positive or negative. The differences in initial owner-
ship, maximum ownership, or change in ownership between friendly and hostile campaigns are not
statistically significant.
4.2.3. Characteristics of Target Companies
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What are some important characteristics of activist targets that differentiate them from
other firms? Table 6 compares the typical target to the average CRSP/Compustat firm in terms of
several valuation, capital structure, performance, and information asymmetry variables. The last
two columns of Table 6 report differences between activist targets and other CRSP/Compustat
firms after propensity-score matching in terms of industry, size, and book-to-market.
Insert Table 6
Table 6 reveals that activist targets are significantly smaller than matched firms, with a mean
market value of $868.54 million and Q ratio of 1.30. Targets underperform in terms of holding-
period return during the 12 months before campaign announcement, even though this underper-
formance is not statistically significant after matching on industry, size, and book-to-market. In
addition, activist targets are not statistically different from the average CRSP/Compustat firm in
terms of growth opportunities (proxied by market-to-book ratio) or book leverage.
Target firms have lower sales growth compared to their matched counterparts but do not show
statistically significant differences in terms of profitability (return on assets (ROA)), asset turnover,
market share, or research and development costs (R&D expense/assets). More importantly, targets
have significantly higher institutional ownership, which is a critical determinant of campaign success
in the more confrontational stages of activism. Overall, hedge fund activists seem to target small
firms with no significant operational problems but some market underperformance.31
In terms of their industry affi liation, most activist targets are in manufacturing and services. The
individual two-digit SIC codes with the highest concentration of activism are business services (17%
of all targets), retail (11%), chemicals (9%), electronic equipment (7%), and instruments (7%). The
fixed effects for each of the above groups are not statistically significant. There is also no evidence
of industry concentration by hedge fund activists, except for highly specialized industries such as
medical instruments and depository institutions. Intuitively, focusing on underperformance issues
general to most firms (such as agency problems) reduces an activist’s marginal cost of initiating a
campaign.
31Previous studies have attributed the targets’market underperformance to agency problems (see Brav et al., 2008;
and Klein and Zur, 2009).
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5. Empirical results
5.1. Costs of activist campaigns
The main goal of this study is to estimate the costs of activist engagements implied by the
observed investment decisions of hedge fund activists in 2000—2007. At each stage of the process,
an activist must choose whether to continue or terminate his campaign based on a cost-benefit
analysis of the intervention. In order to account for the heterogeneity of activist events in terms
of their duration and exit stage, I estimate the costs of three common activist tactics– demand
negotiations, board representation, and proxy contest.32 The cost of an activist campaign equals
the sum of the costs of its component stages.
The estimation methodology uses the activist’s break-even profit constraint for monitoring (as
defined in Eq. (12)) to determine the cost thresholds of the three activism stages. Each cost cutoff
represents a lower bound on the costs of employing a specific engagement tactic and is estimated by
a conditional binary logistic regression. The empirical design incorporates the sequence of logistic
regressions into a statistical backward induction procedure, which estimates first the costs of the
later stages of activism and uses them in the calculation of the costs of its earlier stages.
The starting point of the estimation is the last decision step, the decision node before the proxy
contest stage. The conditional sample of activists who reach that node are divided into two sub-
groups– those who choose to exit after board representation (coded as 0) and those who continue
to a proxy contest (coded as 1). I regress an activist’s continuation decision on his expected gross
return from a successful intervention, which summarizes the benefit from campaign continuation,
and (the inverse of) his marked-to-market investment in the target, which captures the opportunity
cost of the campaign. As described in Eqs. (13) and (14), the first regression coeffi cient determines
the relative magnitude of proxy costs while the second coeffi cient identifies the absolute level of
these costs. Then, I use the estimated costs of the proxy stage in a backward induction procedure
to derive the costs of board representation and demand negotiations.
Table 7 presents the main empirical results. Panel A reports average costs for demand negotia-
32To provide more robust estimates, I combine proxy threat and proxy fight into ‘proxy contest’resulting in three
distinct stages– demand negotiations, board representation, and proxy contest.
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tions, board representation, and proxy contest, including their bias-corrected bootstrap confidence
intervals. The cost of an activist campaign ending in a proxy contest is $10.71 million (equal to
the sum of all three stages). The proxy contest has the highest cost equal to $5.94 million for
the average campaign (with a 95% confidence interval of $3.04 —$10.86 million). In addition to
printing and postage costs to reach a target’s shareholders, this stage typically involves significant
disclosure, legal and other fees of hiring proxy solicitors, corporate governance experts, investment
banks, public relations and advertising firms.
Insert Table 7
The limited anecdotal evidence available can help us put these costs into perspective. Stephen
M. Bainbridge estimates the costs of a proxy contest at $1.8 million based on a survey conducted in
the late 1980s (see Thomas et al., 1998) but points out that “costs almost certainly are much higher
today.” In a letter to the SEC, Ralph V. Whitworth, principal of activist hedge fund Relational
Investors L.L.C., argues that “. . . only a few investors have the expertise and resources to execute a
short slate campaign which in our experience can cost upwards of $10,000,000 at a typical large U.S.
company.”Carl Icahn, one of the most well-known activists, agrees: “At a large public company,
mailing, printing and other costs can run into the millions of dollars.”33
The demand negotiations stage is the second most expensive stage of the activist process, with
average costs of $2.94 million (and a 95% confidence interval of $0.89 —$6.96 million). The estimates
presented in this paper are the first attempt in the literature to quantify the costs of activist-
target negotiations.34 Unlike the proxy contest stage, most of the costs of demand negotiations are
unobservable and cannot be estimated from publicly available information. However, the disclosure
and legal fees associated with this stage most likely represent a smaller portion of its overall costs
than the unobservable costs of the activist’s time and effort.
The least expensive stage is board representation, which adds $1.83 million to the cost of the
average campaign (with a 95% bootstrap confidence interval of $0.46 — $4.32 million). Most of
33See Stephen M. Bainbridge (http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/bainbridge121903.htm);
Ralph V. Whitworth (http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-185.pdf); and Carl Icahn
(http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/03/30/were-not-the-boss-of-aig/).
34Becht et al. (2008) also suggest that unobservable costs dominate the overall costs of private demand negotiations.
See their discussion on p. 3096.
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these costs can be attributed to the activist’s time commitment as a board member or his effort
to identify board representatives. At this stage, many activists also hire consulting or investment
banking firms to prepare formal board presentations of their recommendations. For example, in
late 2005, Carl Icahn hired Lazard to prepare a report on the strategic alternatives available to
Time Warner for “a $5 million fee as well as 5 percent of whatever Mr. Icahn’s dissident group
makes on its Time Warner shares above $18 over the next 18 months.”35 Another activist, Nelson
Peltz of Trian Partners, paid Bear Stearns as much as $1.6 million in 2006 for advisory work on his
bid for board seats at H.J. Heinz.36
Panel A of Table 7 also reports the scale parameters used to identify the absolute magnitudes
of stage costs. As pointed out earlier, these parameters account for unobserved heterogeneity in
the activist sample and improve the precision of the cost estimates. As expected, the proxy contest
has the lowest scale while the negotiations stage has the highest scale. Intuitively, we expect these
parameters to become smaller with every consecutive stage because the activists employing more
confrontational tactics are more homogeneous.
The cost of an average campaign resulting in a proxy contest is $10.71 million. One way to
judge how reasonable the estimated costs are is to compute hypothetical break-even fees based on a
typical hedge fund incentive schedule (2% of assets under management and 20% performance fees).
Assuming that performance fees are assessed on the abnormal returns earned in a campaign (as
reported in Table 8), the mean (median) fees based on value-weighted abnormal returns are $12.4
million ($11.1 million) while the mean (median) fees based on DGTW returns are $17.3 million
($12.1 million). These break-even fees can be viewed as maximum costs that an average activist
would be willing to bear in a campaign assuming the above incentive scheme. The costs of $10.71
million compare favorably to these hypothetical maximum fees.
Panel A of Table 7 also presents several goodness-of-fit measures for each stage-specific logistic
regression. Overall, the best model fit is in the proxy contest stage and the worst in the demand
negotiations stage. The model correctly classifies the activists’exit decisions in 58% of demand
negotiations versus 78% of proxy contests. The R2 is highest for the proxy stage (20%) and lowest
35As reported in The New York Times, December 7, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/07/business/07icahn.html.
36Reported in Board Member Magazine, 2010, http://www.boardmember.com/MagazineArticle_Details.aspx?id=5251.
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for demand negotiations (18%).
Panel B of Table 7 presents additional information about each stage-specific binary logistic
regression. The estimation allows for correlation among the campaigns of the same hedge fund
activist (clustering) and model misspecification (incorrect likelihood function). Both explanatory
variables are significant at 1% in all three regressions. The economic significance of the explanatory
variables is higher in the more confrontational stages of the process.
Due to the recursive backward substitution of estimated costs, the procedure of statistical
backward induction yields biased estimates of the standard errors in the first two stages (board
representation and demand negotiations). To correct for this bias, I use nonparametric bootstrap
to calculate standard errors. Bootstrapping involves repeated sampling (with replacement) from
the data set at hand to estimate the error terms. I calculate bias-corrected bootstrap confidence
intervals for the cost estimates, in which the bias correction adjusts for the potential bias in the tails
of the sampling distribution. The bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals are very similar to
the normal confidence intervals.
5.2. Returns to hedge fund activism
To compare net activist returns to the returns earned by hedge funds in 2000—2007, I
calculate abnormal activist returns in excess of the value-weighted CRSP portfolio (VW returns)
and in excess of characteristic-based portfolios following the approach in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman,
and Wermers (1997) (DGTW returns). I find that the estimated monitoring costs are economically
significant. Under both benchmarks, abnormal activist returns drop by about two-thirds after
subtracting activist costs.
First, I manually match the hedge funds in the activist sample to institutional (13F) data
from Thomson Reuters. Hedge funds with assets under management in excess of $100 million are
required to report quarterly to the SEC all of their long equity positions over $200,000 or 10,000
shares. I am able to match 85 of the 129 hedge fund families in this study. (Table 2 reports the
13F match for the 25 hedge funds with the most activist campaigns in 2000—2007.)
Then, I compute hedge fund returns following the methodology in Griffi n and Xu (2009) who
estimate monthly returns using the latest quarterly-end holding weights of each fund. As Griffi n
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and Xu (2009) argue, monthly returns based on 13F holdings are better suited to evaluating hedge
fund performance because they do not suffer from the return manipulation and survivorship bias
of self-reported hedge fund returns.37 Even though 13F monthly returns ignore short-term trading
(within a quarter), they exhibit high correlation with the returns reported in hedge fund databases
and are representative of hedge fund returns in general.
I calculate DGTW abnormal returns in excess of the returns on 125 characteristic portfolios
based on size, market-to-book, and stock return momentum. As Daniel et al. (1997, p. 1037)
argue, characteristic-based returns "have more statistical power to detect abnormal performance
than factor models."
Table 8 reports the activist returns of the hedge funds in the sample. Panel A presents deal-
period and annualized raw campaign returns. The annualized mean (median) raw return is 31.48%
(26.10%), comparable to the returns reported in Brav et al. (2008). Panel B reports VW and
DGTW annualized abnormal returns. The annualized mean (median) VW abnormal return is
4.02% (3.89%) while the mean (median) DGTW abnormal return is 5.75% (7.61%). The conclusion
reached in Brav et al. (2008, p. 1760) that “the positive average returns are attributed to the right
tail of the distribution”seems to hold for the campaigns in this extended sample.
Insert Table 8
Panel C reports annualized abnormal net returns (that is, returns after subtracting activist
costs). The annualized mean (median) VW abnormal return drops to 0.23% (1.40%) while the
mean (median) DGTW abnormal return becomes 2.38% (3.85%). Both measures show that costs
consume about two-thirds of gross activist returns. It is also interesting to note that the proxy
contest stage has the lowest mean abnormal net returns implying that the proxy process may be
value-destroying from the point of view of the activist.
Do hedge funds earn higher returns on their activist investments than on their other holdings?
The last row of Table 8 helps answer this question by reporting the total (non-activist) portfolio
returns of the hedge funds with 13F holdings information. The annualized mean (median) VW
37Public hedge fund data sources such as the Center for International Securities and Derivatives Markets (CISDM)
and the Trading Advisor Selection System (TASS) data sets cover less than half of the hedge funds in the activist
sample.
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abnormal portfolio return is 14.84% (15.84%) while the mean (median) DGTW abnormal return
is 17.18% (16.38%). Even though the mean activist return is significantly lower than the mean
non-activist portfolio return, the top quartile of activists earns significantly higher returns on their
activist investments than on their non-activist holdings. The 75th-percentile of net activist returns
is not statistically different from the 75th-percentile of total non-activist returns. However, the
90th-percentile of VW (DGTW) net activist returns is 56.51% (44.20%), significantly exceeding
the 90th-percentile of non-activist returns (27.23% and 29.62%, respectively).38
The above results lead to two conclusions. First, subtracting costs significantly reduces gross
activist returns suggesting that costs play a major role in the decision-making behavior of an activist
shareholder. Second, the returns of the top quartile of campaigns exceed the returns on hedge fund
non-activist holdings even though the average hedge fund activist performs worse in activist targets
than in other portfolio companies.
6. Robustness
6.1. Expected activist reward
A target’s maximum (or fundamental) valuation is unobservable and measuring it directly
is not possible. In the main results, I calculate a target’s expected value improvement in terms
of the valuation of a matched peer with similar fundamentals [following the approach in Edmans,
Goldstein, and Jiang (2012)]. In particular, I use a censored quantile regression of the target’s Q
ratio on the tercile ranks of firm characteristics, which remain unaffected by the activist’s demands–
size, asset turnover, market share, growth, and R&D ratio.
I also confirm that the estimation of a target’s maximum potential value is robust to an al-
ternative specification, in which I assume that the activist can improve a target’s value to that of
the best performing industry peer in the same value tercile (that is, no other firm characteristics
except for industry affi liation are used). Industry (also known as “comparable company”) analysis
is frequently used in evaluating potential takeover targets. As seen in Table 9, Panel B, both ex-
38Note also that the annualized standard deviation of net activist returns is about five times higher than the
standard deviation of total portfolio returns.
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planatory variables have high statistical and economic power in this alternative specification (even
though expected gross return is now significant at 5% in some regressions).
Insert Table 9
The estimation of a target’s fundamental value is calibrated to the median actual valuation
improvement achieved by successful activists. In unreported results, I also confirm that the exante
potential for value improvement is not statistically different between expost successful and failed
campaigns. This additional evidence confirms that the chosen valuation metric accurately reflects
the potential for value improvement due to activism.
6.2. Activist heterogeneity
One way, in which I correct for unobserved activist heterogeneity, is by computing stage-
specific scale parameters, as shown in Table 7. A more direct way to account for unobserved
heterogeneity is to control for activist-specific attributes in the estimation of the cost thresholds.
Table 10 presents the same three logistic regressions as the baseline model but adds three ad-
ditional explanatory variables capturing activist heterogeneity. The additional covariates are the
number of contemporaneous campaigns by a hedge fund activist in a given quarter, an indicator
(Active HFs) for the hedge funds with the most campaigns in the sample period (measuring expe-
rience), and an indicator (Hostile HFs) for the hedge funds with the most proxy contests between
2000—2007 (measuring preference for confrontational engagements). The list of the respective hedge
funds in each group is presented in Table 2.
Insert Table 10
The included activist characteristics have high explanatory power in most regressions. The vari-
able measuring the number of contemporaneous campaigns by the same hedge fund has the lowest
economic significance. The other two additional covariates have the highest economic significance
in the proxy stage. The results suggest that a firm targeted by a hostile activist is more likely to
reach a confrontational stage while a firm targeted by a more experienced activist is less likely to
make that transition.
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6.3. Activist ownership
Defining the activist’s break-even constraint for monitoring assumes that the size of his
ownership stake does not affect the success of the engagement. Panel A of Table 5 reveals that the
change in ownership during a campaign (stage) is minimal implying that activists do not use high
ownership strategically to exert pressure in their negotiations with a target.
I further evaluate this assumption in a multivariate setting by estimating the probability of
a successful campaign outcome as a function of ownership (and ownership squared), the tactic
used by the activist, the duration of the campaign, and institutional ownership. Tactic (or stage) is
included because more confrontational approaches are typically associated with higher success rates.
Campaign duration controls for the activist’s investment horizon, the assumption being that longer
campaigns have a higher probability to achieve success. Institutional ownership is an important
determinant of success in the more confrontational stages of activism. The (unreported) results
confirm that ownership and/or ownership squared are not statistically significant in determining a
campaign’s probability of success.
Finally, I re-estimate costs excluding campaigns, in which the activist’s stake exceeds the 95th-
percentile of ownership in the sample (16%). Note that this level of ownership is below the level
required to influence company procedures relying on shareholder voting. For example, 85% of
Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 companies impose ownership thresholds above 25% to call a special
meeting or do not give their shareholders that right.39 The exclusion of high ownership campaigns
has no effect on the estimated costs.
6.4. Takeover activity and learning
Most previous studies of hedge fund activism (see Brav et al., 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009;
Becht et al., 2008) document that the cross-sectional variation in (abnormal) activist returns is
influenced by the stated campaign objectives. Alternatively, Greenwood and Schor (2009) argue
that only activist events resulting in an M&A transaction earn significant abnormal returns. To
evaluate whether takeover activity has additional predictive power after controlling for a campaign’s
39See article by Ted Allen of Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), April 2011,
http://www.deallawyers.com/Blog/2011/04/proxy-season-preview-takeover-defenses.html.
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objectives, I compare abnormal activist returns between events ending in an M&A and those with
no M&A activity. Using data from Thomson Reuters Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum, I
identify 104 acquisitions among the sample of activist targets by restricting the announcement date
of a takeover to be between the start of the campaign and 180 days after the exit of the activist
(or December 2007, if no exit is observed).
Table 11 reports the results. Panel A presents unconditional results while Panel B compares
mean returns between the M&A and non-M&A samples after controlling for stated activist objec-
tives. The difference in mean abnormal VW (DGTW) returns between the treatment (M&A) and
control (no M&A) groups is 23.77% (20.61%), significant at 1%. These results seem to confirm
Greenwood and Schor’s (2009) conclusion that only events resulting in a sale earn significant ab-
normal returns. However, the mean difference in returns between the M&A and non-M&A groups
becomes insignificant after taking into account activist costs (i.e., in terms of net abnormal returns).
Insert Table 11
Panel B compares the mean abnormal returns between the M&A and non-M&A samples after
controlling for the stated activist objectives, which are classified in one of four broad groups–
corporate governance, restructuring and strategic alternatives, capital structure, and opposition
to a proposed deal. The difference in mean gross and net VW (DGTW) abnormal returns is
insignificant between the two subsamples. This suggests that takeover activity has no additional
predictive power after controlling for a campaign’s objectives.
I also verify (in unreported results) that learning has no effect on campaign outcomes. I compare
successful and failed campaigns in terms of proxies for the activist’s learning. The first proxy
consists of hand-collected communication between the activist and the target (as described in Table
5). The other two proxies for learning are the number of filings by the activist and the current
length of the campaign. None of the learning proxies is statistically different between successful and
failed campaigns after controlling for the campaign’s predicted probability of success (estimated as
in the previous subsection).
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7. Concluding remarks
The goal of this paper is to measure the costs of activist monitoring and provide a better
understanding of the net returns to activism. I focus on the principal cost-benefit trade-off facing
an activist and study its effect on the choice of negotiation tactics in communicating with a target.
The approach taken in this study consists of two interrelated parts. First, I model activism as
a sequential decision process consisting of demand negotiations, board representation, and proxy
contest, and define the activist’s break-even constraint for monitoring. Then, I examine this trade-
off condition in a discrete-choice framework and estimate the costs of activism implied by the
observed decisions of activist investors between 2000 and 2007.
This paper complements recent work on hedge fund activism by providing cost benchmarks for
evaluating the net returns to activism. I find that the average campaign ending in a proxy fight
costs $10.71 million. Subtracting costs reduces the mean abnormal activist return by two-thirds
suggesting that costs play a major role in the activist’s decision-making behavior. I find that the
returns of the top quartile of campaigns exceed the returns on hedge fund non-activist holdings even
though the average hedge fund activist performs worse in activist targets than in other portfolio
companies.
This paper also introduces a comprehensive hand-collected data set of hedge fund activist
campaigns between 2000 and 2007, which contains detailed information about the evolution of each
campaign and the negotiation tactics employed by activists. The large-sample evidence presented
in this paper aids in understanding the nature and evolution of activist engagements.
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Appendix A. SEC Schedule 13D
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, rules 13d-1 to 13d-6, contains the filing requirements
for large shareholders. Schedule 13D is commonly referred to as a "beneficial ownership report" and
must be submitted to the US Securities and Exchange Commission within ten days by any investor
who acquires ownership of 5% of the voting stock of a public company. Any material changes in
the facts contained in the original filing (such as a change in beneficial ownership by more than
1%, a change in the investment intent, or the preferred method of communicating with the firm)
requires a prompt amendment.
Schedule 13D consists of seven sections:
1. Security and Issuer - Basic information regarding the type and class of security and the
contact information of the beneficial owner.
2. Identity and Background - Background information such as the type of investment business
the owner engages in and related investment vehicles managed by the owner.
3. Source and Amount of Funds or Other Considerations - The source of the owner’s investment
capital (usually working capital funds).
4. Purpose of Transaction - This is the most important portion of the 13D filing for the purposes
of this study. It describes the beneficial owner’s investment intent, main demands, and level
of engagement with the firm.
5. Interest in Securities of the Issuer - Expands on Section 4.
6. Contracts, Arrangements, Understandings or Relationships with Respect to the Securities of
the Issuer - Reports any special relationships between the beneficial owner and the company.
7. Materials to Be Filed as Exhibits - This is the second most important section. It contains any
exhibits that may be filed along with the form such as letters to the management or board
of the firm as well any agreements between the two parties. Exhibits can also elaborate on
the Purpose of Transaction (Section 4).
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Item 4 lists ten specific actions of a large shareholder that would require disclosure:
(a) The acquisition by any person of additional securities of the issuer or the disposition of
securities of the issuer;
(b) An extraordinary corporate transaction, such as a merger, reorganization, or liquidation,
involving the issuer or any of its subsidiaries;
(c) A sale or transfer of a material amount of assets of the issuer or any of its subsidiaries;
(d) Any change in the present board of directors or management of the issuer, including any
plans or proposals to change the number or term of directors or to fill any existing vacancies on
the board;
(e) Any material change in the present capitalization or dividend policy of the issuer;
(f) Any other material change in the issuer’s business or corporate structure including but
not limited to, if the issuer is a registered closed-end investment company, any plans or proposals
to make any changes in its investment policy for which a vote is required by Section 13 of the
Investment Company Act of 1940;
(g) Changes in the issuer’s charter, bylaws, or instruments corresponding thereto or other actions
which may impede the acquisition of control of the issuer by any person;
(h) Causing a class of securities of the issuer to be delisted from a national securities exchange,
or to cease to be authorized to be quoted in an inter-dealer quotation system of a registered national
securities association;
(i) A class of equity securities of the issuer becoming eligible for termination of registration
pursuant to Section 12(g)(4) of the Act; or
(j) Any action similar to any of those enumerated above.
Note: Schedule 13G is an alternative SEC filing which must be filed by anyone who acquires
beneficial ownership in a public company (i.e., owns more than 5% of a company). The 13G filing
is considered a more passive version of the 13D, and has fewer reporting requirements. Activist
practices are not permitted by 13G filers unless they re-file as 13D investors.
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Appendix B. Carl Icahn and Time Warner Inc.
On August 9, 2005, Dow Jones reported that Carl Icahn had started accumulating a stake in
Time Warner Inc. and was exploring institutional support for his plan to restructure the Com-
pany.40 Among Icahn’s demands were a break-up of the media conglomerate and a substantial in-
crease of its share repurchase program. Initial conversations with Richard Parsons, Time Warner’s
CEO, were characterized as “productive”but did not result in an agreement on the right approach
to increase shareholder value.
On September 12, Mr. Icahn took the next step in his campaign by proposing nominees to Time
Warner’s board. He argued that shareholder-nominated directors were “particularly important at
Time Warner because of the difference of opinion between many large shareholders and management
concerning the direction of the company and the lack of share price performance under current
management.”
A month later, on October 11, Carl Icahn escalated his campaign to the preliminary proxy stage
and issued an open letter to all shareholders (reported in a Schedule 14A): “In life and in business,
there are two cardinal sins. The first is to act precipitously without thought, and the second is to
not act at all. Unfortunately, the Board of Directors and top management of Time Warner already
committed the first sin by merging with AOL, and we believe they are currently in the process of
committing the second.”41 Icahn enumerated the following failures of the current management and
board: the AOL “disaster,” “fire sale” of Warner Music and Comedy Central, failure to acquire
MGM, and “bloated”cost structure.
On October 31, Steve Case, co-founder of AOL and one of the main architects of its merger
with Time Warner, resigned from the board of directors. Two days later, the Company increased
its current stock buyback program from $5 billion to $12.5 billion. At the same time, Time Warner
was exploring a sale of its publishing business, which was completed in February 2006.
Dissatisfied with the progress of his campaign, Icahn hired Lazard to prepare a report on the
strategic alternatives available to Time Warner. In a press release, Icahn described the financial
40This case study illustrates the challenges in performing a cost-benefit analysis of an activist campaign. Press
reports and quarterly holdings information from SEC 13F filings are typically the only sources of information. This
skews the available evidence in favor of larger and more visible activists and companies.
41See http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/921669/000110465905047809/a05-17463_1ex2.htm.
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terms of the Lazard engagement: a $5 million fee and "an additional incentive fee" of 5% of any
increase in Time Warner’s price over $18 in the next 18 months.42 Several days later, Robert C.
Clark, a board member of both Time Warner and Lazard, resigned from Time Warner’s board.
On December 19, 2005, Mr. Icahn openly questioned the Company’s agreement to sell a stake
in AOL to Google Inc. "On the eve of a proxy contest, I believe it would be a blatant breach of
fiduciary duty to enter into an agreement with Google that would either foreclose the possibility of
entering into a transaction that would be more beneficial for Time Warner shareholders or make
such a transaction more diffi cult to achieve."43 On January 30, 2006, Carl Icahn proposed Frank
Biondi, a former CEO of Universal Studios Inc. and Viacom Inc., to replace Richard Parsons and
lead the restructuring of Time Warner.
On February 7, 2006, Carl Icahn and Lazard released a 343-page analysis of Time Warner,
which recommended that the Company be split into four independent entities (the AOL online
division, a film and cable networks company, a publishing company, and a cable operator), reduce
costs, and repurchase a total of $20 billion of company stock.
Ten days later, Time Warner announced an agreement with Carl Icahn to increase its existing
share repurchase program to $20 billion and extend its duration through December 31, 2007. In
addition, the Company agreed to appoint two new independent directors based on recommendations
from major shareholders such as Icahn Partners and achieve cost reductions of $1 billion in 2007.44
Icahn’s demand for a break-up of the company was not part of the agreement, probably because of
its lukewarm reception among other institutional investors.
Estimating Carl Icahn’s financial gain from this campaign is diffi cult without detailed trading
data. However, we can approximate the benefits of the campaign by the increase in value of Icahn’s
ownership stake between December 31, 2005 and December 31, 2006, the first and last 13F filings
reporting an ownership stake in Time Warner. In that period, Time Warner’s adjusted closing
price increased by $9.02 (26.37%), giving Icahn a gross profit of $100.12 million.
42Press release available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/921669/000092847505000229/dfan14a.txt.
43See http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/921669/000092847505000239/dfan14a1219.txt.
44See http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/921669/000092847506000082/dfan14a02172006.txt.
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Fig. 1. A sequential definition of the activist process. The figure depicts the sequential definition of
activism, in which an activist shareholder chooses a more hostile tactic only after less confrontational
approaches have failed. Under this definition, activism consists of demand negotiations, board
representation, and (threatened) proxy contest.
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Table 1
Distribution of activist campaigns by year and activism stage
The table presents the distribution of hedge fund activist campaigns in 2000—2007. Data are
collected from SEC Schedule 13D and proxy statements. The sample also includes nonpublic events
(i.e., below the 5% regulatory threshold) reported in the press and described in Brav et al. (2008).
The full sample consists of 1,164 unique campaigns. The CRSP-Compustat merged sample includes
953 unique events. Standard exclusions are applied– bankruptcies, ADRs, REITs, funds, trusts, and
left-censored observations. Panel A presents the distribution of campaigns by year and activism stage
(initial filing, demand negotiations, board representation, and proxy). The last column denotes the
total number of campaigns during each year. Panel B describes the distribution of the sample across
the stages of the activist process. % Total denotes the percent of events reaching each activism stage.
Panel A: Distribution of activist campaigns by year and stage
Year Filing % Total Negotiations % Total Board % Total Proxy % Total # Campaigns
2001 86 63.70% 22 16.30% 16 11.85% 11 8.15% 135
2002 118 62.43% 32 16.93% 27 14.29% 12 6.35% 189
2003 141 62.67% 44 19.56% 22 9.78% 18 8.00% 225
2004 149 62.87% 38 16.03% 32 13.50% 18 7.59% 237
2005 191 51.48% 98 26.42% 46 12.40% 36 9.70% 371
2006 227 48.40% 115 24.52% 73 15.57% 54 11.51% 469
2007 284 50.27% 117 20.71% 95 16.81% 69 12.21% 565
Panel B: Distribution of activist campaigns by stage
Full activist sample CRSP-Compustat merge
Stage Targets % Total Targets % Total
Initial filing 1164 100.00% 953 100.00%
Negotiations 342 29.38% 300 31.48%
Board 203 17.44% 179 18.78%
Proxy threat 122 10.48% 113 11.86%
Proxy fight 74 6.36% 68 7.14%
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Table 2
List of activist hedge funds
The table lists the 25 hedge funds with the most campaigns during 2000—2007. Proxy contests
refers to the number of campaigns that reach the proxy stage. The column labeled 13F Data reports the
availability of holdings data from Thomson Reuters 13F Institutional Holdings used in return calculations.
Hedge fund Activist campaigns Proxy contests 13F Data
Loeb Partners Corp./ Third Point Management 103 4 Y
Millennium Management, Millenco LLC 51 0 Y
Steel Partners II LP 48 6 Y
Farallon Capital Management LLC 48 0 Y
ValueAct Capital Management LP 35 1 Y
Hummingbird Management 35 0 N
Blum Capital Partners LP 26 0 Y
Carl Icahn 26 7 Y
Prides Capital Partners LLC 23 0 Y
Barington Capital Group LP/ Clinton Group 23 5 Y
Chap Cap Partners 21 0 Y
Ramius LLC 20 5 Y
Yorktown Avenue Capital/Boston Avenue Capital 19 0 N
Pirate Capital LLC 18 4 Y
Wynnefield Partners Small Cap Value LP 18 2 Y
SCSF Equities LLC 18 0 N
Riley Investment Management LLC 15 3 Y
Perry Corp 15 0 Y
Lawrence B. Seidman 15 7 N
Financial Edge Fund LP/ John Morrison 15 6 N
Jana Partners LLC 15 2 Y
Shamrock Activist Value Fund LP 14 1 Y
Bulldog Investors GP/ Phillip Goldstein 14 6 N
Cannell Capital LLC 13 0 Y
Harbinger Capital Partners 13 2 N
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Table 3
Common activist demands
The sample consists of 1,164 hedge fund campaigns in 2000—2007, of which 342 contain demands.
The number of demands exceeds the number of events because some campaigns have multiple demands.
Panel A reports the success rate of each type of activist demand. A campaign is considered successful
if the activist achieves his stated objectives or reaches an agreement with the target. Panel B reports
success rates in terms of the stage of the activist process, at which a campaign ends (as described in Fig. 1).
Panel A: Success rate of activism by demand
Number of % of Successful % Success
Primary activist demands campaigns Sample campaigns rate
1. Strategic direction & alternatives 280 55.56% 96 34.29%
- Sale of company to a third party 159 31.55% 51 32.08%
- Operational ineffi ciency; restructuring 69 13.69% 24 34.78%
- Activist bid to take target private 52 10.52% 21 40.38%
2. Capital structure 100 19.84% 20 20.00%
- Dividends/ repurchases/ excess cash 78 15.48% 13 16.67%
- Recapitalization/ debt restructuring 22 4.37% 7 31.82%
3. Opposition to a proposed merger 63 12.50% 18 28.57%
4. Corporate governance 61 12.10% 13 21.31%
- Remove CEO; separate CEO/Chairman 27 5.36% 5 18.52%
- Excessive executive compensation 20 3.97% 3 15.00%
- Additional disclosure; possible fraud 14 2.78% 5 35.71%
Overall success rate 504 100% 173 29.17%
Panel B: Success rate of activism by stage
Number of % of Successful % Success
Exit after campaigns Initial sample campaigns rate
Demand negotiations 342 29.38% 23 6.76%
Board representation 203 17.44% 79 39.33%
Proxy contest 122 10.48% 70 57.38%
Overall success rate 29.17%
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Table 4
Investment horizon of hedge fund activists
The table reports statistics on the investment horizon of hedge fund activists between 2000—2007.
Panel A provides a breakdown of events in terms of the activism stage, at which a campaign is terminated.
Exit is defined as the last SEC Schedule 13D filing by an activist or December 2007 if no exit is observed.
The last italicized row of Panel A excludes activist events, in which no formal demands were announced
(i.e., the activist’s stated objective is shareholder maximization or the target’s market undervaluation).
Panel B presents the length of each distinct stage of the activist process. Reported variables are in months.
Panel A: Investment horizon of hedge fund activists (in months)
Percentile 25% 50% 75% 90% Mean SD
Exit after initial filing 0 5 13 25 9.42 13.52
Exit after demand negotiations 2 6.5 16 27 10.48 11.35
Exit after board representation 7 15 27 41 19.43 16.12
Exit after proxy contest 10 18 34 64 25.78 21.59
Average (per campaign) 3 9 20 36 14.66 16.96
Average (campaigns w/ specific demands) 6 14 26 41 18.75 18.20
Panel B: Length of individual activism stages (in months)
Percentile 25% 50% 75% 90% Mean SD
Initial filing 3 3 9 15 7.49 8.55
Demand negotiations 3 3 6 12 6.44 6.89
Board representation 3 3 9 15 6.79 7.03
Proxy contest 3 3 6 15 6.90 7.09
Average (per stage) 3 3 9 15 7.28 8.54
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Table 5
Analysis of activist ownership
The table reports ownership data for the sample of hedge fund activist campaigns in 2000—2007.
Panel A reports ownership statistics for each stage of a campaign, including initial ownership at the
start of a campaign stage, maximum ownership accumulated during a stage, and change in ownership
(defined as the difference between maximum and initial stage ownership divided by initial ownership).
Panel B reports ownership statistics by campaign for successful/ failed and friendly/ hostile events.
A campaign is classified as successful if the activist achieves his stated objectives or reaches a partial
agreement with the target. A campaign is considered friendly if the average communication between
the activist and the target (disclosed in Schedule 13D and coded as positive or negative) is positive.
Panel A: Ownership by activism stage
(1) Initial ownership, % (2) Maximum ownership, % Change ((2)-(1))/(1)
Activism stage 50% 75% 95% Mean 50% 75% 95% Mean 50% Mean
Initial filing 7.00 10.00 16.00 8.51 8.00 10.00 20.00 8.95 0.00 10.21
Demand negotiations 7.00 10.00 16.00 7.41 8.00 10.00 17.00 8.37 0.00 36.04
Board representation 9.00 13.00 19.00 9.46 10.00 14.00 21.00 10.70 0.00 41.62
Proxy fight 8.00 11.00 15.00 7.94 8.00 11.00 15.00 8.52 0.00 28.40
Total 8.00 10.00 16.00 8.27 9.00 11.00 18.00 9.11 0.00 30.61
Panel B: Ownership by campaign type
(1) Initial ownership, % (2) Maximum ownership, % Change ((2)-(1))/(1)
Mean St. error Mean St. error Mean St. error
Successful campaigns 6.81 0.47 8.73 0.51 60.49 16.68
Failed campaigns 7.16 0.25 8.92 0.24 44.91 7.78
Difference -0.45 0.53 -0.19 0.56 15.58 18.40
Mean St. error Mean St. error Mean St. error
Friendly campaigns 7.16 0.32 9.26 0.33 53.96 10.79
Hostile campaigns 6.96 0.31 8.50 0.30 45.02 9.94
Difference 0.20 0.44 0.76 0.45 8.94 14.67
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Table 6
Characteristics of companies targeted by hedge fund activists
The table presents the characteristics of companies targeted by hedge fund activists in 2000—2007.
Columns 4 and 5 report unmatched comparison of activist targets to the average CRSP/Compustat firm.
Columns 6 and 7 present differences between the average target and the average CRSP/Compustat firm
after propensity-score matching in terms of industry, size (market cap), and book-to-market ratio.
Market value is market capitalization in millions of dollars. Book-to-market is book value of equity to
market value of equity. Q ratio is defined as market equity plus total debt plus preferred stock plus
deferred taxes and investment credit divided by assets. Stock return is the holding period return during
the 12 months before campaign announcement. Book leverage is debt divided by total firm assets.
ROA is operating income over total assets. Asset turnover is sales over total assets. Growth is sales
growth over the previous four quarters. R&D is research and development expense over assets.
Market share is defined in terms of industry sales. Institutional data come from Thomson Reuters
Institutional Holdings (13F) database and analyst coverage is from Thomson Reuters Institutional
Brokers’Estimate System (I/B/E/S). All variables are lagged by one quarter and winsorized at 1%.
Stars denote standard statistical significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, respectively).
Summary statistics Difference Matched difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Characteristic Mean Median SD Avg. diff St. error Avg. diff St. error
Market value 868.54 155.22 2915.85 -2711.18 171.560 -1313.50*** 133.76
Book-to-market 1.27 0.60 2.98 0.055 0.074 -0.031 0.089
Q -ratio 1.30 0.97 1.13 -0.413*** 0.025 -0.374*** 0.029
Stock return 0.12 0.02 0.70 -0.063** 0.028 -0.017 0.031
Book leverage 0.23 0.19 0.23 -0.002 0.003 0.003 0.047
ROA 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.004*** 0.001 0.000 0.001
Asset turnover 0.26 0.23 0.19 0.036*** 0.003 -0.003 0.004
Sales growth 0.10 0.03 0.43 -0.079*** 0.007 -0.065*** 0.009
Market share 0.04 0.00 0.10 -0.003** 0.002 0.001 0.002
R&D 0.28 0.00 1.92 -0.089*** 0.032 0.031 0.036
Inst. ownership 0.57 0.58 0.32 0.143*** 0.005 0.126*** 0.007
Analysts 8.28 6.00 7.19 -2.093*** 0.180 -0.355* 0.202
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Table 7
Costs of commonly used activist tactics (stages of activism)
The table reports cost estimates for the three most common tactics of hedge fund activists in 2000—2007.
The sample excludes events whose outcome is unknown as of December 2007. The estimation consists of
a backward sequence of conditional logistic regressions corresponding to the activist’s break-even constraints
for each stage of a campaign. These constraints also provide the structural parameters (called Scale below)
required for identification of the absolute level of costs. Panel A reports average stage costs with bootstrap
confidence intervals. The total cost of a campaign equals the sum of the costs of its component stages.
% Classified denotes the percent of correctly classified campaign continuations. The R2 is McFadden’s R2.
Panel B presents the conditional logistic regressions used to estimate the activist costs in Panel A.
The independent variable is the activist’s continuation decision at each stage and the dependent variables
are the current value of the activist’s stake and the expected gross return from campaign continuation.
The expected gross return is the expected firm value in a successful campaign and is estimated by a
quantile regression of the firm’s Q ratio on the tercile ranks of firm characteristics. Standard errors are
clustered by activist campaign. Stars denote statistical significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Panel A: Stage-specific costs ($M)
Tactic Mean 95% Interval Scale R2 % Classified
Demand negotiations $2.94M $0.89M $6.96M 3.68 17.90% 58.09%
Board representation $1.83M $0.46M $4.32M 2.99 18.20% 60.69%
Proxy contest $5.94M $3.04M $10.86M 1.15 20.40% 77.78%
Panel B: Stage-specific logistic estimation
Coeffi cient St. error Obs.
Demand negotiations Marked-to-market investment -2.809*** (0.671) 241
Expected gross return 0.271*** (0.103)
Board representation Marked-to-market investment -2.389*** (0.792) 145
Expected gross return 0.334*** 0.122)
Proxy contest Marked-to-market investment -3.287*** (0.951) 63
Expected gross return 0.869*** (0.225)
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Table 8
Analysis of activist returns
The table reports the returns of hedge fund activists during 2000—2007. Returns are computed starting one
month before a campaign and ending with the last Schedule 13D filing or December 2007. Abnormal returns are
in excess of the value-weighted CRSP portfolio (VW returns) or characteristic portfolios as in Daniel et al. (1997)
(DGTW returns). The last row reports total (non-activist) returns of the hedge funds with 13F holdings data.
Panel A: Raw campaign returns
Deal period returns, % Annualized returns, %
Stage 25% 50% 75% Mean SD 25% 50% 75% Mean SD
Demand negotiations -7.36 18.96 75.10 30.85 68.15 -9.81 25.28 100.12 41.13 78.69
Board representation 5.11 40.20 101.23 49.43 85.95 3.41 26.80 67.49 32.95 70.18
Proxy contest 3.17 37.67 80.67 36.88 65.48 1.65 19.65 42.09 19.24 47.30
Total -1.03 32.63 90.70 39.35 74.34 -0.82 26.10 72.56 31.48 66.49
Panel B: Annualized abnormal returns
VW returns, % DGTW returns, %
Stage 25% 50% 75% Mean SD 25% 50% 75% Mean SD
Demand negotiations -21.72 4.88 33.56 8.28 57.54 -19.27 9.29 35.05 7.59 48.41
Board representation -16.55 1.93 21.61 1.62 62.28 -8.85 6.35 23.94 6.82 47.94
Proxy contest -13.99 6.35 20.01 3.01 42.52 -5.88 5.94 16.83 3.28 35.51
Total -16.06 3.89 25.14 4.02 54.10 -11.01 7.61 24.66 5.75 43.93
Panel C: Annualized abnormal net returns
VW returns, % DGTW returns, %
Stage 25% 50% 75% Mean SD 25% 50% 75% Mean SD
Demand negotiations -31.68 2.33 37.32 0.39 74.94 -27.65 6.41 36.11 3.97 58.87
Board representation -21.38 0.00 23.25 -1.47 67.80 -14.99 3.48 21.91 4.65 48.12
Proxy contest -15.17 1.05 15.17 -2.56 46.53 -16.04 0.61 13.33 -1.89 37.68
Total -19.01 1.40 22.39 0.23 58.05 -16.59 3.85 21.66 2.38 45.60
Total (non-activist) returns 4.40 15.84 22.85 14.84 11.78 10.76 16.38 22.88 17.18 8.75
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Table 9
Stage-specific logistic regressions: alternative estimation of target valuations
The table presents results of a backward sequence of logistic regressions estimating activist costs.
Logistic regressions correspond to the activist’s break-even profit constraints for each activism stage.
The independent variable is the activist’s continuation decision at each stage and the dependent variables
are the current value of the activist’s stake and the expected gross return from campaign continuation.
Panel A reports results, in which gross returns are estimated by a censored quantile regression of the firm’s
Q ratio on the tercile ranks of firm characteristics (sales, asset turnover, market share, growth, and R&D).
Q ratio is defined as market equity plus total debt plus preferred stock plus deferred taxes and investment
credit divided by assets. Panel B estimates gross returns in terms of the best performing industry peer
in the same value tercile as the target (no firm characteristics except for industry affi liation are used).
Standard errors are clustered by campaign. Stars denote significance levels (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Panel A: Logistic estimation (potential target value based on firm characteristics)
Coeffi cient St. error Obs.
Demand negotiations Marked-to-market investment -2.809*** (0.671) 241
Expected gross return 0.271*** (0.103)
Board representation Marked-to-market investment -2.389*** (0.792) 145
Expected gross return 0.334*** 0.122)
Proxy contest Marked-to-market investment -3.287*** (0.951) 63
Expected gross return 0.869*** (0.225)
Panel B: Logistic estimation (potential target value based on industry affi liation)
Coeffi cient St. error Obs.
Demand negotiations Marked-to-market investment -2.180*** (0.491) 242
Expected gross return 0.221** (0.113)
Board representation Marked-to-market investment -1.989*** (0.563) 147
Expected gross return 0.329** (0.147)
Proxy contest Marked-to-market investment -3.346*** (1.087) 63
Expected gross return 0.932*** (0.343)
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Table 10
Stage-specific logistic regressions with controls for activist characteristics
The table presents results of a backward sequence of logistic regressions estimating activist costs.
Logistic regressions correspond to the activist’s break-even profit constraints for each activism stage.
The independent variable is the activist’s continuation decision at each stage and the dependent variables
are the current value of the activist’s stake, the expected gross return from campaign continuation, and
activist controls, including the number of contemporaneous campaigns by a hedge fund activist in a
given quarter (Number of ongoing campaigns), an indicator (Active HFs) for the hedge funds with the most
campaigns in the sample period (measuring experience), and an indicator (Hostile HFs) for the hedge funds
with the most proxy contests in 2000—2007 (measuring preference for confrontation). Standard errors are
clustered by activist campaign. Stars denote statistical significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Stage Covariates Coeffi cient St. error
Demand negotiations Marked-to-market investment -3.034*** (0.808)
N=241 Expected gross return 0.639*** (0.179)
Number ongoing campaigns -0.451** (0.230)
Indicator: Active HFs -0.983** (0.442)
Indicator: Hostile HFs 1.267** (0.527)
Board representation Marked-to-market investment -2.247*** (0.728)
N=145 Expected gross return 0.485*** (0.179)
Number ongoing campaigns -0.505*** (0.192)
Indicator: Active HFs 0.164 (0.537)
Indicator: Hostile HFs 1.109*** (0.425)
Proxy contest Marked-to-market investment -3.916*** (1.428)
N=63 Expected gross return 1.141*** (0.422)
Number ongoing campaigns -0.399 (0.389)
Indicator: Active HFs -2.496** (1.149)
Indicator: Hostile HFs 2.688** (1.344)
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Table 11
Abnormal activist returns and takeover activity
The table reports the abnormal annualized returns realized by hedge fund activists in 2000—2007.
Included are only campaigns with specific activist demands, which are classified in one of four broad groups–
corporate governance, restructuring and strategic alternatives, capital structure, opposition to a proposed deal.
The sample is further subdivided into treatment (M&A) and control (No M&A) groups based on M&A
activity. M&A transaction data from Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum identify 104 activist targets acquired
between the start of the campaign and 180 days after the activist’s exit, or the end of 2007 if no exit is observed.
Abnormal activist returns are calculated in excess of the value-weighted CRSP portfolio (VW returns) or in
excess of characteristic portfolios as in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) (DGTW returns).
Net returns subtract activist costs estimated as in Table 7. All return measures are winsorized at 1%.
Panel A reports the difference in mean returns between the treatment (M&A) and control (No M&A) groups.
Panel B uses propensity-score matching to control for the four types of activist demands (defined above).
Stars denote standard statistical significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, respectively).
Panel A: Annualized abnormal (net) returns
Abnormal returns M&A No M&A Difference St. error t-Stat
Value-weighted returns, % 25.03 1.26 23.77*** 6.97 3.41
Value-weighted net returns, % 14.23 6.40 7.83 5.59 1.40
DGTW returns, % 17.53 -3.08 20.61*** 7.06 2.92
DGTW net returns, % 10.99 2.51 8.48 6.00 1.41
Panel B: Annualized abnormal (net) returns (controlling for activist demands)
Abnormal returns M&A No M&A Difference St. error t-Stat
Value-weighted returns, % 25.03 25.54 -0.51 8.50 -0.06
Value-weighted net returns, % 14.23 10.99 3.24 7.36 0.44
DGTW returns, % 17.53 12.80 4.73 9.10 0.52
DGTW net returns, % 10.99 11.64 -0.65 7.22 -0.09
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